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Lederer: Long-Arm Application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to Industry in

NOTES
LONG-ARM APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST
ACT TO INDUSTRY IN THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN COMMON MARKET*
The economic development of Latin American nations has long been an
important objective of the foreign policy of the United States. 1 In light of
this broad basic policy, the United States encourages the growth of private
enterprise in Latin America to help develop these economically underdeveloped nations.2 Such private enterprise must, however, operate under the
Sherman Act, 3 which was decisionally framed by the courts for domestic
rather than foreign commerce. 4 Although much competition exists to develop
American markets,5 American businesses must operate at a disadvantage
because, unlike the laws of other capital exporting countries, the antitrust
laws of the United States have a long-arm effect.8 This aspect of the Sherman
Act causes anxiety to business concerns interested in entering the Central
American Common Market (CACM) and will continue to do so in the future7
unless definitive standards are developed for its application to foreign commerce.
While claiming the desire to promote the economic growth of the CACM,
the United States has followed a policy of strictly applying the Sherman Act
to foreign commerce. s In the CACM the status of an integrated industry9
0 This note is a revision of the seminar paper that was awarded the Senator Smathers
Prize in Latin American Law for 1968-1969.

1. H.R. Doc. No. 374, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1630, 1632 (1966) (President Johnson requested $543 million for the Alliance for Progress); Budget Message of President Kennedy,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1962, §1, at 1, cols. 1, 7.
2. U.S. DEr"T or COMMERCE, FOREIGN DiREcr INVESTMENT REGULATIONS 17-a to 17-c

(1968).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1964).
4. Note, The Role of the American Corporation in the Economic Development of
Latin America: A Study of the Conflict Between the ExtraterritorialApplication of the
United States Antitrust Laws and United States Foreign Policy, 19 VAND. L. REV. 757, 774
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Latin American Development].
5. Comment, Joint Ventures in Latin America: The Antitrust Aspects, 41 TUL. L REv.

84, 93 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Joint Ventures].
6. Id. at 94.
7. Id. at 95.
8. Id. at 85. It has been suggested that perhaps there is no real policy conflict because
in those cases where the antitrust laws have had a long-arm effect the equities of the situation have demanded application. Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A
Study of the Antitrust Consequences of the Principle [sic] Forms of Investment by American Corporations in Foreign Markets, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 400, 412 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Forms of Investment].

9. Integrated industry status is a grant to a specific industry that meets the qualifications established by the Regime for Integrated Industries. In obtaining such status the
company is permitted to manufacture and market goods in the CACM without regard to
internal territorial boundaries. Once this status is achieved, competitors are restricted in
entering the same line of commerce.
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effectually confers a monopoly because the benefits granted to an integrated
industry10 prevent competitors from entering the market. Although seeking
the status of an integrated industry appears to violate the Sherman Act, failure
to achieve such a status would probably prevent an American company from
locating in the CACM since the status would otherwise be granted to a foreign
cartel. Furthermore, such an investment must occur under the Integrated
Industries Regime 1 if it is to be effective because the small number of consumers in each country of the CACM makes it economically impractical to
serve the market of only one nation.
Governmental policy concerning the application of the Sherman Act to
international commerce is to ensure protection of American foreign commerce
from unfair foreign competition infringing upon the sovereignty of other
3
countries-2 and to protect American merchants in a competitive market.1
Under the rationale that any restraint of commerce is a public injury, the
Sherman Act applies to both domestic and foreign commerce.1 4 In light of
the policy of strictly enforcing the Sherman Act to promote free competition,
potential conflict with the policy of promoting CACM industrial development
through American private enterprise is apparent if one considers that the
CACM, under the Regime for Integrated Industries, condones the existence
of monopolies that are necessitated by relatively small populations and lack
of consumer capital.15
In the long-arm application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce
some commentators believe that the position of the Department of Justice
has been "more unyielding than that of the courts"' 6 and that the Department

10. Benefits accorded an integrated industry vary with the type of industry. Basically,
the protections are import priorities, tax benefits, and freedom from import and export
duties. No similar benefits may be conferred on a competitor. Any industry that enters
and achieves the status of an integrated industry is guaranteed at least this result. The
host country may also provide other benefits tip to and including a full grant of monopoly.
11. All treaties and protocol agreements that help establish integrated industries are
frequently referred to as the "Integrated Industries Regime."
12. Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, '49 VA. L. REv. 925 (1963).
American foreign policy in the application of antitrust laws to foreign operations has
been more broadly stated as the restoration of eliminated competition, but the restrictive
interpretation is more widely accepted. Compare REP. Ar'v GEN. NATIONAL Comm. To
STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS 76 (1955) [hereinafter cited as REP. ATr'y GEN. COMm.] and cases
cited therein), with United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (remedies).
13. Forms of Investment, supra note 8, at 403. The policy objectives of the antitrust
laws as applied to foreign commerce are: "(a) [O]ptimum fair and, within limits, free
competition in United States imports; (b) freedom of access and opportunity for Americans to sell or invest in foreign markets .... ... K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 5 (1958) [hereinafter cited as K. BREWSTER].

14. See United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); REP. ATr'Y
GEN. Coss. 79 (1955); K. BREwSTER, supra note 13 at 76; Carlston, Foreign Economic Policy
and the Antitrust Laws, 40 MINN. L. REV. 125 (1956).
15. Carlston, supra note 14, at 136; Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 758.
16. Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 776.
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7
attempts to force strict compliance with the policies of the antitrust laws
without exercising prosecutorial discretion.'8 This result is attributable to the
Department's refusal to consider the practical results of a restraint of trade
within the context of the CAGM, and could spell disaster for that organization's approach to economic development. The factors that necessitate such
an approach include tie oath of office of staff members of the Department
of Justice, limited facilities that preclude a regulatory approach, and the
belief that American business suffers no real hardship from a strict application
of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce. 19 Although such an approach
appears consistent with the purpose of the antitrust laws, it seriously hampers
economic development within the CACM because restraints of trade may in
some instances be necessary in developing an economically backward country.
Since such a rigid approach could cause international repercussions
beyond the scope of private business, the Department of State and the Department of Justice have adopted a practice of conferring before any Sherman
Act prosecution takes place in the area of foreign commerce. 20 When consultation occurs the only relevant consideration is the presence of political problems that militate against the bringing of an action.21 The result of this procedure appears to be official approval of the subordination of economic
policy to antitrust policy because the Department of Justice currently requires
strict application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce. Such a strict view
of the Sherman Act means that any restraint, even if of unquestionable public
benefit, will run afoul of the antitrust laws. 22 Since the Department of Justice
decides whom to prosecute, the policy conflict will usually be resolved in
favor of the application of the antitrust laws. In examining this conflict this
note will consider the scope, policy, and application of the Sherman Act; the
problems created by the CACM; and the effect of the application of the
Sherman Act to different types of business ventures in the CACM.

17. "The federal antitrust laws expressly include foreign commerce within their scope,
and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department apparently feels duty-bound to
enforce those laws as written." Address by William H. Orrick, Jr., former Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, before the Quarterly Meeting of the United
States Inter-American Council, Inc., in New York City, Dec. 7, 1964, cited in Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 776.
18. "The Division has specifically rejected the suggestion that it use its discretion as a
prosecutor to act in the capacity of a regulatory agency mitigating the harshness of a
strict application of existing antitrust principles to foreign commerce." Id.
19. Id. at 776-77.
20. REP. ATT'y GEN. Comm. 94 (1955).
21. "Broadly speaking any pending action by the Justice Department likely to have
political repercussions with foreign governments is referred to the Division of Restrictive
Business Practices. When such a referral is made, the Division of Restrictive Business Practices concerns itself with only one issue: Are there any political reasons why the pending
action should not be brought? If the answer . . . is in the negative, the consultation ends
at that point. Questions of economic policy and antitrust law are left entirely to the Justice
Department." Interview with David B. Ortman, Division of Restrictive Business Practices of
the United States Department of State, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1965, cited in Latin
American Development, supra note 4, at 776.
22. Gesell, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Joint Venture and the Prosecutor, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 31, 83 (1965).
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APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO FOREIGN COMMERCE

Long-arm jurisdiction of the antitrust laws in foreign trade or commerce
emanates primarily from the Sherman Act. Most cases involving foreign commerce involve a Sherman Act violation and, since this is the cornerstone of
American antitrust laws, it is of primary concern. Other antitrust laws, especially the Clayton Act,2 3 may be applicable to joint ventures with special
regard to the CACM, but to date only one case has been decided under section
24
7 of that act.
Policy and Views of a Sherman Act Violation
Sections 1, 2, and 4 of the Sherman Act are generally applicable to foreign
commerce.2 " The basic policy of the Sherman Act, preservation of free competition, springs from the belief of Congress that free competition best promotes the growth and stability of the American economy and assures the
continuity of our political and social institutions.2- ; This seems to be aimed
primarily at preserving competition in domestic commerce rather than in
foreign commerce; yet, by the very language of the act, foreign commerce is
expressly included.27 Although business exigencies create major differences
between domestic and foreign commerce, the courts apply Sherman Act antitrust principles to both areas without material alteration to accommodate the
varied problems faced by the different ventures. Such equal application is
allegedly based upon an attempt to further the policy of the Sherman Act.28
The classification of trade suppression in foreign commerce as a per se violation of the Sherman Act has made it the Government's primary weapon in
checking violations of antitrust policy in this field.2 However, it has been
23. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1964).
24. United States v. Monsanto Co., 1967 Trade Cas. H72,001 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (involving
a joint venture between two of the world's largest chemical companies, Monsanto Co. and
Farbenfabriken Bayer, A. G., a German corporation).
25.

"Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
" 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964); "Every person

S.. with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....

who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce

nations, shall be .

.

. guilty ....

. . . with foreign

" 15 U.S.C. §2 (1964); "The several district courts of the

United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of . . . this
title ....
" 15 U.S.C. §4 (1964). Venue is determined under §4 of the Clayton Act, which

provides: "[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States . . . in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without

respect to the amount of controversy .... ." 15 U.S.C. §15 (1964). Section 4(A) of the
Clayton Act refers to suit by the United States, in identical language. 15 U.S.C. §15(A)
(1964).
26. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see United States v.
General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1964).
28. E.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1928); Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 774. See generally Fugate, note 12 supra.
29.

Bridges, Foreign Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 52 A.B.A.J. 360 (1966).

See also United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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suggested that the realities of the international business situation must be
considered, and that new principles expressly applicable to foreign commerce
be read into the Sherman Act by the courts.3 0 In an attempt to further antitrust policy, private investment in the CAGM may be inadvertently harmed
because investors may seek another market rather than risk prosecution under
the Sherman Act.
Actions alleged to be violative of the Sherman Act are scrutinized under
one of two standards in determining their legality: the per se concept or the
rule of reason. Restraints of trade are per se unlawful if they are of a type
the courts view as inherently bad, thus precluding further inquiry as to actual
injury to the public.3 ' In such cases all affirmative defenses are precluded and
only the facts may be disputed. 3- Certain types of domestic arrangements are
held to be per se violative of the antitrust laws3 3 on the basis that experience
has proved such restraints unreasonable. Because of the impossibility of determining the reasonableness of a nondomestic restraint without a detailed
examination of the entire world market,3 4 most of the cases involving American business in foreign commerce apply the per se rule. Per se violations of
the Sherman Act occur when price fixing relating to exports to the United
States is proved, when exports are precluded from the United States to a
foreign nation, when an express or implied agreement to limit production is
38
found, or when a division of markets involving the United States takes place.
Although the per se doctrine is not favored by most commentators, it has
been argued that this approach is the most beneficial in foreign commerce
because it creates certainty and uniformity that would be lacking under the
rule of reason approach.3 7 Theoretically, the per se rule is fair because business has notice of the permissible limits of conduct, but practically this is not
the case. In certain cases business practices restraining trade may be both
reasonable and necessary, although in other cases the same restraints would
unquestionably merit condemnation.
Domestic commerce has long used the rule of reason when examining
various alleged antitrust violations.38 The rule of reason was first incorporated
30. REP. ATr'Y GEN. Comm. 76 (1955); Carlston, supra note 14, at 136.
31. Abend, Application of the Per Se Doctrine to Commerce with Foreign Nations:
Desirable or Disastrous, 49 VA. L. Rav. 448, 456 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Per Se Application].

32. Affirmative defenses in the area of foreign commerce are discussed in text accompanying notes 104-134.
33. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements
foreclosing competition); Fashion Originator's Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940) (price fixing); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899)
(division of markets).
34. Per Se Application, supra note 31, at 453
35. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1139, 1175 (1953).
36. Swacker, Foreign Business Operations under United States and Common Market
Antitrust Laws, 19 Bus. LAw. 493, 499 (1964).
37. Per Se Application, supra note 31, at 454.
38. The rule of reason has been held applicable in all domestic cases not involving
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into the Sherman Act in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.3 9
This approach to the Sherman Act allows the court discretion in deciding
whether any act is sufficiently anticompetitive to be proscribed. 40 Under this
method only those restraints that are "unreasonable" in the context of all
the facts, circumstances, and affirmative defenses are illegal as antitrust
violations. The language of the Act is interpreted by weighing economic
41
benefits against public injury rather than by artificial or mechanical means.
It has been argued that if American foreign commerce is to exist on a competitive basis with other nations, the rule of reason approach must be employed in antitrust situations. Both the United States and the economically
underdeveloped nations will ultimately benefit from the fruits of such activity.4 2 It has also been urged that the per se approach to foreign commerce is
neither practical nor desirable because fixed rules equally applicable to both
domestic and foreign commerce remove the flexibility required by American
businessmen to compete effectively with foreign cartels. 4 If competition is to
be promoted under the Sherman Act, the rule of reason should be applicable
to commerce in a market with a consuming public the size of the CACM
because the inability of such a market to support many competitors almost
requires that "anticompetitive" practices be employed.
Procedural Problems of the Sherman Act
Before considering the Sherman Act sections regarding substantive violations, the procedural aspects of venue, personal jurisdiction, and legislative
jurisdiction must be discussed. If any of these three essential procedural ingredients is lacking, a situation involving foreign commerce is not subject
to antitrust regulation because the court is not competent to hear the suit.44
Venue is of relatively little importance, for it may be laid in any federal
district court where "the defendant resides or is found or has an agent .... " 4
If the defendant is a resident of the United States, no venue problem arises.
Problems could exist if the violator were a foreign corporation not doing
business in the United States. In such cases, however, a liberal interpretation
of the "found" provision has been used to establish sufficient contact for
venue purposes.40 The problem of forum non conveniens could be significant,
violations enumerated in note 3 supra.

39. 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911).
40.
41.

Per Se Application, note 31 supra.
Applachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
42. REP. Arr'Y GEN. CozMM. 76 (1955); Per Se Application, supra note 31, at 458; see
Oppenheim, note 35 supra.
43. Per Se Application, supra note 31, at 457.
44. If the alleged violator neither resides nor is found nor has an agent in the United
States, the suit may not be instituted. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1964). Litigation may not be instituted
under the Sherman Act if there is no contact with the United States. 15 U.S.C. §3 (1964).
This notion was explicitly stated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
45. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1964).
46. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., Ltd., 149 F. Supp. 830, 836-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(held venue properly laid where a subsidiary produced and marketed oil for the parent).
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but relief on such a ground has been regularly denied. 47
Before rendering a valid judgment in an in personam action, personal
jurisdiction must be obtained through proper service of process on a defendant
having certain "minimum contacts" so that the "fundamental fairness" required by due process is maintained. 48 Personal jurisdiction for violation of
the Sherman Act in foreign commerce presents little problem when subsidiaries
of American firms are involved. A court would have jurisdiction over the
American parent and could enforce the Sherman Act even though in personam
jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiary might not be obtainable. 49 It is well
established that service of process on a wholly owned subsidiary confers jurisdiction over the parent,50 and that service of process on a parent confers
jurisdiction over a partly5' or wholly owned subsidiary. 52 Separate corporate
identity may apparently be disregarded in establishing jurisdiction for violating the Sherman Act,5 3 but this may be limited to situations where corporate
independence was not scrupulously maintained, and the subsidiary was regarded as an agent.5 4 However, separate legal existence of an American subsidiary may not guarantee the foreign parent immunity from personal jurisdiction,r5 since the Sherman Act provides protection for American commerce from
anti-competitive conspiracies affecting domestic commerce. The defense of sovereign immunity, under which the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the
acts of foreign sovereigns, has been held inapplicable to the instrumentalities
of a foreign government engaged in domestic commerce.58 Further, mere purchase of goods by a subsidiary for its parent is sufficient contact to bind the
parent if service of process is obtained on the subsidiary.57 Hence, it seems that
personal jurisdiction is liberally interpreted when dealing with the Sherman
Act's application to foreign commerce. One possible justification for this
position is that if the courts were lacking personal jurisdiction and could
not easily obtain it, unreachable violations of the Sherman Act would frustrate congressional intent.
47. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40,
46 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The court held that, although a Swiss corporation committed the alleged violations in Switzerland, it was the most convenient forum because no prejudice
resulted and the laws allegedly violated were those of the United States. An American joint
venture designed to gather market information and repair Swiss watches was the basis of
jurisdiction.
48. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 778; see Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting the Reach of Substantive Law under the
Sherman Act, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1030, 1033 (1967).
50. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(offices and staff were used to carry on the business of the British parent corporation).
51. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40,
48 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

52. K. BRmvsraa, supra note 13, at 60.
53. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).

54. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp.
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

40,

55. K. BREWSrER, supra note 13, at 60.
56. United States v. Deutches Kalisyndikat GeseIlschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
57. Latimer v. S/A Ifidustrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Commentators express concern over strict application of the Sherman Act
to foreign trade because factors unique to foreign commerce are not considered. 58 Such concern revolves around the concept of legislative jurisdiction,
the legal ability to create laws governing conduct occurring outside the United
States. After the requirements of personal jurisdiction have been met, it must
be ascertained whether the challenged conduct is so foreign that it is beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act. 59 Any justification for the application of the
Act must rest on the concept of protection of United States trade or commerce
that has been or may be injured by unlawful conduct that, although foreign
in situs, is nonetheless subject to the legislative jurisdiction of Congress
through the long-arm application of the Sherman Act. 60 Courts have held that
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act may properly occur, provided
its application does not violate accepted principles of international law('
Although presumptively territorial in scope, 6' the Sherman Act is consistently applied to foreign as well as domestic commerce. The language in
the Sherman Act is both explicit and crucial: "Every contract, combination
... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... with foreign nations,
is . . . illegal. . . . Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt . . . or
conspire to monopolize ... trade or commerce .
with foreign nations, shall
be . . .guilty.
"63 Legislative jurisdiction as thus defined is equally broad

for both substantive sections. Under the language of the Sherman Act foreign
conduct is proscribed only if such conduct restrains trade or commerce.
Hence, a twofold test is stated: the conduct must be restrictive, and it must
be restrictive of the trade or commerce of the United States. If the conduct
has no effect on the trade or commerce of the United States, the Sherman Act
is inapplicable since legislative jurisdiction is not invoked. 4 However, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to envision any instance involving an American
company where either the export or import trade of the United States is
not "affected" by the acts of that business in foreign commerce.6 5
Since the test is unlimited in scope the courts have indicated that before
the legislative jurisdiction of the Sherman Act attaches, the effects of the
challenged acts must be substantial or unreasonable 6 and must not involve
any international complications.-7 The effect must be real and must fall
within the intended ambit of the Act.68 If the effect is not substantial and
little economic injury occurs, the courts frequently look to the character of

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

E.g., Latin American Development, note 4 supra.
K. BREWSR, supra note 13, at 65.
See Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 781.
Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 779-80.
K. BREWSTER, supra note 13, at 65.
15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1964).
See note 44 supra.

65.

Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Ap-

proach, 70 YALE L.J. 259, 261 (1960).
66. United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp. 603, 605 (Dist. Ct. Hawaii 1963).
67. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1,18 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
68.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss2/4

8

Lederer: Long-Arm Application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to Industry in
1969]

THE SHERMAN ACT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

the restraint rather than strictly to its "effect." 69 The intent to restrain
despite inconsequential effects, is itself sufficient to invoke the Sherman Act.
Before effects may confer legislative jurisdiction under the Sherman Act they
must "restrain trade or commerce . ..with foreign nations." 0 It has been
suggested that "trade or commerce" concerns export, import, or domestic
trade,71 and that the financing of a business venture falls outside the trade
or commerce requirement. However, the Supreme Court has indicated that
the "trade or commerce" language of the Sherman Act applies to the entire
73
range of American economic activity.
A trend toward broadening the effects test in the area of foreign trade
or commerce is apparent. Legislative jurisdiction was originally limited almost
exclusively to an effect on domestic commerce.7 ' " In American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co, 75 a treble damage suit between two domestically based corporations, it was alleged, although without strong documentation, that the
Costa Rican Government's interference with a railroad that benefited the
American Banana Company at the expense of the United Fruit Company was
instigated by the latter firm.76 In construing the Sherman Act to preclude
legislative jurisdiction77 the Court reasoned that the conduct involved the
Act of State doctrine of international law, under which a foreign government's
acts solely within its borders are not reviewable by courts in another sovereign
nation. A conceptual conflict exists when the act of persuading a sovereign
to act is held to be unlawful despite that sovereign's declaration that such
actions are desirable."" American Banana, while still considered somewhat
viable by the Department of Justice,7 9 has been distinguished, if not overruled,
by cases such as Continental Ore Co.v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.80 in
which the Court said: "[A] conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic
or foreign commerce of. the United Stats is not outside the reach of the

69. Beausang, The ExtraterritorialJurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 DicK. L. REv.
187, 191 (1966); see joint Ventures, supra note 5, at 86-87.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1964); REP. Arr'Y GEN. Comm. 76 (1955).
71. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
72. REP. ATr'y Gm'N. CoMm. 80 (1955).
73. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962). See also
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
74. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 353.
77. Id. at 357. The language of the Sherman Act "will be taken as a matter of course
to mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently
may be able to catch . . . . We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in
Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is
concerned."
78. Id. at 357-58.
79. The Department apparently feels that American Banana precludes application of
the antitrust laws to areas where the act of state doctrine applies. Address by William H.
Orrick, Jr., former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, before
the Conference on Antitrust and the European Communities, in Brussels, Belgium, Sept. 25,
1963, cited in Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 782 n. 109.
80. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign
countries."' Such reasoning seems to be based on the effects test of the
Sherman Act. Thus, the Act appears applicable to any restraint of foreign
commerce, even if the complained of conduct occurs totally within a foreign
country, as long as the export or import trade of the United States is "affected"
2

by such restraint.8

Substantive Violations Under the Sherman Act
An examination of an alleged substantive violation of the Sherman Act
requires the determination of a relevant market.83 The relevant market is
that line of commerce in which the alleged restraint occurs.8 4 The necessity
of determining a relevant market may be illustrated by the following
example. It would be patently absurd to say that X company has either conspired to restrain trade or has monopolized it in production of golf balls,
when the only trade backdrop presented is X company producing only wickets.
Such a market would be irrelevant. On the other hand, the relevant market of
Y company, a pipe manufacturer, would be too narrow if the market considered were the manufacture af one-inch pipe when other sizes could reasonably satisfy the requirements. Hence, the cross-elasticity of products must be
considered in determining the relevant market. The basic problem in defining
a relevant market is the reasonableness of where the line is drawn. If Y company producd all the one-inch pipe because of a low demand, yet produced
only a fraction of the entire pipe production in all sizes, it would seem
foolish to charge Y company with monopolizing the entire pipe market; neverthe less, it is a monopoly in the one-inch pipe market. Although the same concept applies to a conspiracy charge under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the
relevant market does not need to be as finely delineated as in a section 2
violation; a section I conspiracy must intend only to restrain trade, and need
not, as in section 2, intend to monopolize a particular market.85
Another problem is determining which geographic market is relevant.
For example, if A company, a sulphur mining concern, and B company, a steel
corporation, create a joint venture to drill for oil off the Alaskan coast and
expressly agree to buy out all competitors and attempt to preclude any new
competitors from drilling in that area, a restraint of trade clearly exists. The
problem is whether the relevant market is the total oil production in the
United States or the Alaskan oil production. Under the foreign trade or
81.

Id. at 704. This has been the approach of the Supreme Court ever since American

Banana was decided. See generally Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty,

49 VA. L. REV. 925 (1963).
82. See United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957);
Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

83. REP. A'rr'v GEN. Co,-im. 81 (1955).
84. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass.
1953), afJ'd per curianz, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 505-18 (1948); Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing
Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279 (1934).
85. Compare 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964), with 15 U.S.C. §2 (1964).
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commerce provisions of the Sherman Act similar problems arise. If a competitor is excluded from a domestic market, a Sherman Act violation occurs if the
exclusion contains the necessary intent. In the CACM the problem is whether
foreclosure from a single foreign market is a sufficient restraint, since injury
to export competition is in fact minimal in the area of the CACM.8 6 It is the
policy of the Department of Justice to consider such restraints illegal.sr
Under the language of section 1 of the Sherman Act, a violation occurs
if a combination or conspiracy intends to restrain trade. Here, the character
of the act, not the act itself, determines substantive illegality. Under section 1
the restraint must be undue or unreasonable,88 and must arise from a conspiracy or combination, therefore, requiring a plurality of actors.8 9 A conspiracy may be illegal when it occurs between a parent and a subsidiary or
between two independent competitors. 90 In the area of foreign commerce
this concept is also applicable. 91 Hence, common control does not free a corporation from application of section 1 of the Sherman Act.92
Foreign trade or commerce includes both imports and exports of the United
States. It has been stated that an American parent that successfully prevents
its joint venture from exporting to the United States violates the Sherman
Act because section 1 of that Act precludes such action. 93 Further, it has
been indicated that an American manufacturer's foreclosure of a single foreign
market to exporting competitors by establishing manufacturing plants there
violates section 1, provided that a combination and intent to foreclose the
market is proved.94 The Government's case would be greatly strengthened by
a showing that American products in a reasonable volume could be profitably
exported to that market. 95 This position contravenes the policy of promoting
the economic growth of the GACM if an entry into the market by an American
company with a locally based plant would prevent its American competitors
from exporting. It is axiomatic that an agreement with the primary objective
of achieving an unlawful purpose is itself illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 96
Section 2 of the Sherman Act concerns monopolization of trade or commerce. Three separate and distinct violations-are contained in section 2;9T it is
86. K. BRawsmra, supra note 13, at 85. See also Joint Ventures, supra note 5, at 113.
87. Address by L. Bernstein (Chief, Special Litigation Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice), Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n, Inc., Nov. 24, 1964, published in 10
ATrmusr BuLL. 25, 27 (1965).
88. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911).
89. See generally REP. A'rr'Y GEN. CoM. 30 (1955).
90. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947) (this case also included
a §2 violation).

91. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
92. Id.
93. See joint Ventures, supra note 5, at 108.

94. United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
95. Id. at 647.
96. See United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).

97. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1964) declares illegal a conspiracy to monopolize, an attempt to
monopolize, or monopolizing trade or commerce,
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therefore necessary to distinguish between monopoly and monopolizing.
Monopolizing or the attempt or conspiracy to monopolize is illegal under
the Sherman Act, while being a monopoly is not necessarily illegal. Therefore,
the method by which a monopoly is obtained is critical in determining
legality.Ys If a monopoly exists, this does not necessarily mean that a company
is guilty of monopolizing under the statute. In United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America,99 Judge Learned Hand suggested that in the area of foreign commerce a monopoly could exist if thrust upon a company under certain conditions such as a limited market, a change in taste, or superior managerial skill.
The crucial missing element would be the lack of intent to monopolize.100
Although monopoly power may be lawfully acquired, the exercise of that
power to perpetuate that monopoly at the expense of competition is a section 2
violation °10 The language of the statute implies that a section 2 violation
10 2
requires the power to become a monopoly and the exercise of that power.
It seems absurd to say a person without the power to achieve this end is
guilty of attempting to monopolize or monopolizing in fact. Perhaps a conviction for conspiring to monopolize might result, but given the more difficult
section 2 requirement of proof of a specific intent, as opposed to the
more general intent of conspiring to restrain trade under section 1, a conviction under section 1 could be more easily obtained. This section could also
be more effectively utilized to prevent concerted action at an earlier time,
thus preventing further harmful restraints. It has been suggested that size
alone could create a monopoly that might also violate the monopolizing
prohibition, but in such cases size would have to be great. 1 3 Size alone however, does not seem to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. If a company
exercises its monopoly power and prevents entry into a market, such action
is monopolizing and violates section 2 of the Sherman Act even though the
04
United States Government itself was instrumental in creating the monopoly.'
Defenses Available to the Sherman Act
In the area of foreign trade or commerce, defenses include those applicable
to domestic cases only, those used in both domestic and foreign trade cases,
and those used only in foreign trade. A reasonable restraint is permissible if
it is ancillary to the attainment of a legitimate objective. 0 5 In United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,' 0 6 it was stated that ancillary restraints were permissible under the following conditions: there must be a nexus between the
98.

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
1961).
105.
rev'd on
106.

Id. at 429-30.
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948).
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 424.
See United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, 193 F. Supp. 18, 32-33 (S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
other grounds, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
Id.
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restraint and the interest sought to be protected; the restraint may not be
total, for example, it may not last for an excessive duration or eliminate all
competition; and the primary purpose of the restraint must be the furtherance of a legitimate objective.10 7 However, this defense has been rarely successful, even though it is available in foreign commerce cases.' 08 This defense
has been used primarily in foreign trade cases involving licensing agreements'09 accompanied by territorial limitations. This extension of a legal
monopoly"O is generally permitted because the end sought is legitimate. An
exchange of patents may bring about a better developed technology."'. Such
licensing is frequently accompanied by some division of markets or production
restraints that the courts view as illegal per se. Thus, the ancillary doctrine is
not available as a defense because the legitimate purpose is only complementary to the illegal major purpose." 2 Many companies suggest that the
exigencies of business"1 3 in the area of foreign commerce should be a defense
to the long-arm application of the Sherman Act. This argument was met
head-on and rejected in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States.: 4 This
case involved American and foreign companies and included several agreements to divide territories, fix prices, and eliminate competition. In rejecting
the proffered defense the Court stated:"15
We also reject the suggestion that the Sherman Act should not be
enforced in this case because what appellant has done is reasonable in
view of current foreign trade conditions. The argument in this regard
seems to be that tariffs, quota restrictions and the like are now such
that the export and import of antifriction bearings can no longer be
expected as a practical matter; that appellant cannot successfully sell
its American-made goods abroad; and that the only way it can profit
from business in England, France and other countries is through the
ownership of stock in companies organized and manufacturing there.
This position ignores the fact that the provisions in the Sherman Act
against restraints of foreign trade are based on the assumption, and
reflect the policy, that export and import trade in commodities is both
possible and desirable.... Acceptance of appellant's view would make
the Sherman Act a dead letter insofar as it prohibits contracts and
conspiracies in restraint of foreign trade.
This broad language was voiced over a strong dissent by Justice Frankfurter,
107. Id. at 282.
108. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); K. BRawsTm,
supra note 13, at 86.
109. A licensing agreement is one in which a patent holder permits others to use his

monopoly.
110.
1951).
111.
112.
113.
why the
114.
115.

See United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 518 (S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
Different business conditions and foreign cartel arrangements are two reasons
Webb-Pomerene Act was enacted. 15 U.S.C. §61-65 (1964).
341 U.S. 593 (1951).
Id. at 599.
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who urged the specific adoption of the rule of reason for foreign trade." '
It has been suggested that the dissent rather than the majority presents
sounder reasoning"' because the application of domestic antitrust concepts
to foreign business requirements is not a truly rational approach.
It has been held that economic and political barriers to American competition are a sufficient defense for a restraint of trade if private action in
the form of a restraint was necessary to secure entrance into a market, "[f]or
the very hypothesis is that there is not and could not be any American
foreign commerce in that area which could be restrained or monopolized.""' ,
In United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 1 9 the court
indicated that in the case of economic or political barriers proof that products
could not be otherwise exported profitably to a particular market was a
defense to the application of the Sherman Act. However, the court distinguished between possibility and practicality in finding a violation of the
Sherman Act since the companies fell within the Webb-Pomerene Act exclusion. 1 20 In an earlier sectional case involving an alleged conspiracy to restrain
trade by dividing territories, nonprofitability of exports was implicitly
rejected as a defense. 1 2' The court intimated that such activity was a per se
violation of the Act. "-2 However, this case involved two foreign defendants
who were attempting to restrain American domestic commerce through
23
restriction by legitimate agreements of imports into the United States.1
Such broad reasoning, which might otherwise have precluded foreign investment, was modified by the court's statement that nothing in the opinion
could "[P]roperly be read as a prohibition against an American manufacturer
seeking to make larger profits through mere ownership of a branch factory
abroad .

"...24

Another defense to a Sherman Act violation in foreign commerce is that
the alleged restraint was required by a foreign government. It is recognized
that mere monopoly does not violate section 2' -2 if the monopoly were thrust
on the company. In order to make this defense available, however, the
116. Id. at 605 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "Of course, it is not for this Court to
formulate economic policy as to foreign commerce. But the conditions controlling foreign
commerce may be relevant here. When as a matter of cold fact the legal, financial, and
governmental policies deny opportunity for exportation from this country and importation
into it, arrangements that afford such opportunities to American enterprises may not fall
under the ban of a fair construction of the Sherman Law because comparable arrangements
regarding domestic commerce come within its condemnation."
117. REP. Arr'Y GEN. COMM. 83 (1955).
118. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass.
1950).
119.
120.
tributes
121.

92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
See id. at 959. The Webb-Pomerene Act permits export associations with the atof a foreign cartel to compete in foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§61-65 (1964).
United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).

122. Id. at 647.
123. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 962 (D. Mass.
1950).
124. Id. at 962-63.

125.

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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monopoly must be compelled by law; it must not be a publicly conferred
private restraint.12 A private party is therefore not excused from liability
if discriminatory legislation is solicited from a foreign country. 127 For example,
although a defendant became the exclusive selling agent of the foreign
government because it was the only economically successful operation that
had occurred, 28 the Sherman Act was nonetheless violated because of a
conspiracy to obtain foreign legal assistance to restrain trade. 29 However, if
preexisting foreign law makes an act legal, conspiring to commit such an act
would not violate the antitrust laws if no attempt is made to obtain additional
favorable legislation. 13 It has been suggested that an absolute defense to the
Sherman Act arises when the questioned act is required or permitted with
overtones of a requirement.' 2 ' A restraint that is sanctioned but not compelled by a foreign government and used solely to produce greater profits
and not to preserve one's good standing in the eyes of that government will
not give rise to an affirmative defense. 32 This is well illustrated in the oil
cartel cases' 33 in which the court specifically stated that the defendants did
not have to abide by the decree if certain agreements and actions were
required by foreign law, or if the agreements and actions were taken pursuant
to an official pronouncement or request by another nation and failure to
comply might result in substantial business loss. 34 This mandatory rule
appears to be founded upon sovereign immunity and the act of state
doctrine. 1 35 Under either concept the courts could not hold the -sovereign
liable. It would therefore be unfair to hold that a person has violated the
Sherman Act when he merely complies with a foreign government's requirements that are beyond the reach of American jurisdiction.
MONOPOLY UNDER THE INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES REGIME IN THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET

Theoretical monopoly exists when one firm has achieved complete control
of a particular industry. The maintenance of an actual monopoly generally
requires the presence of two factors. First, a monopolist must have complete
control over the selling price of an item that is a monopoly. Second, preservation of the monopoly requires that competition be effectively controlled.
The existence of competition precludes monopoly because of the continual
126. K. BREiWsr., supra note 13, at 93-94.
127. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). See generally Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REV. 925 (1963).
128. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
129. K. BREiwsrrE, supra note 13, at 95.
130. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
131. See REP. Airr'y GEN. COMM. 83 (1955).
132. Id.
133. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. ff69,851 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United
States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 1960 Trade Cas. ff69,849 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (con-

sent decrees).
134. Id.
135. Fugate, supra note 127, at 932.
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challenges presented by other procedures to force the price of an item into
a competitive range, thus preventing the requisite price control. Hence,
competition and monopoly are mutually exclusive terms. Practically speaking,
however, it is possible to have a monopoly without the power to control price
or to prevent competitors from entering a market. This might occur where
it was unprofitable for another to enter a market or where immense amounts
of capital were required for production. Because of the CACM's small, relatively narrow domestic markets, economic and industrial integration is
essential for its success. In order to achieve this broadening of markets,
thereby stimulating the economy, a free trade area for specified products
was established among member countries of the CACM. Furthermore, when
the CACM was created in 1958, provisions were made for industrial integration to help expand markets and create economic unity in Central America. 1 3 6
The Integrated Industries Regime is the backbone of the integrated
industries system as it exists today.137 In order for an organization to attain
integrated industry status the Central American Industrial Integration Commission must be shown that the company's efficient operation requires access
to the entire CACM.13s A further requirement is satisfactory proof of a system
of quality control. If integrated industry status is to be achieved and maintained, a company must produce a product that will cause no harm to the
consuming public and that is necessary for the economic growth of the
CACM. 13 9 The former of these two criteria is often liberally interpreted by
the Central American Institute of Industrial Research and Technology, the
body charged with establishing standards of quality control.140
With the status of an integrated industry, a company is allowed to trade
freely among the members of the CACM.141 Any competitor is allowed an
initial ten per cent reduction in the uniform tariff rate and a further ten per
cent reduction for each year thereafter; in the tenth year it is granted completely tariff-free trade. 142 Under this system a practical monopoly is
created because no financially responsible organization would enter a market
where it must compete against a company receiving such a benefit.
Integrated industries may benefit from special legislation ranging from
tax incentives to an absolute grant of monopoly. 43 However, member nations
136. Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration,
June 10, 1958, as cited in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA 11 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as ECONOMIC INTEGRATION]. Article XXI provides for industrial integration. "With a
view to promoting industrial development consistent with the purpose of this Treaty, the
signatory States shall adopt, by mutual agreement, measures designed to further the establishment or expansion of regional industries directed towards a Central American common
market and of particular interest to the economic integration of Central America."
137. Agreement on the System of Central American Integrated Industries, June 10, 1958.

as cited in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 136, at 89.
138. Id. article II, at 90.
139.

Id. article III, at 90.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. article IX, at 92.
Id.
Id. article IV, at 90-91.
Id. article VI, at 91.
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of the CACM may not grant similar benefits to any goods that are "equal
or similar to or substitutes for goods manufactured" in CACM countries
by integrated industries.144 Under this provision an integrated industry may
receive reduction of import duties and favorable exchange rates to the
exclusion of competitors, both of which permit production of goods at a
lower cost. Furthermore, if a national emergency arose and imports became
difficult to obtain, an integrated industry would receive preferential treatment because its necessary imports would have priority over those of competitors.145 To illustrate, assume General Motors becomes an integrated
industry. It must import steel to manufacture automobiles, as must Ford,
a nonintegrated industry competitor. Assuming the import duty is fifty
dollars per ton, General Motors has a lower production cost of at least fifty
dollars per ton of steel that enters the automobile and may therefore undersell
Ford by such an amount. Ford could not receive an exemption from import
duties since its product would be "equal or similar to or substitute for"
that of General Motors. Assume further that both plants are located in
Costa Rica where the currency exchange rate is about seven colones per dollar
brought into the country and 6.8 colones for each dollar taken out of the
country. Ford could receive no such benefit. For each 100 dollars General
Motors brings into the country it receives upon conversion 720 colones, while
Ford receives only 700 colones for the same dollar amount. For each 720
colones removed in profits, General Motors receives approximately 106
dollars, while Ford receives only 103 dollars. General Motors would make a
three per cent profit on the exchange rate, which could then be poured back
into production and overhead costs. In addition, if there is a shortage of steel
General Motors can fill its needs first despite Ford's willingness to pay more.
The Treaty of Economic Integration4 6 grants certain other basic exemptions. Article IV provides that goods manufactured in a member nation of
the CACM are exempt from import and export duties. Manufacture does
not include mere assembly, packaging, bottling, cutting up, or dilution in
the exporting country. 47 If both General Motors and Ford built a stamping
and an assembly plant, only General Motors would be exempt from such
duties as an integrated industry.
Under the Agreement for Fiscal Incentives48 a company with integrated
industry status may obtain certain fiscal benefits that may be increased at the
discretion of the host country. While there is no guarantee of such an increase,
it would be unrealistic to say that a company the size of General Motors
could not be successful in prevailing upon the host country for additional
benefits. Fiscal incentives are not limited to manufacturing industries.' 49
144. Id. article VII, at 91.
145. Id.
146. General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960. as cited
in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 136, at 23.
147. Id. article V, at 24.
148. Central American Agreement on Fiscal Incentives to Industrial Development, July
31, 1962. as cited in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 136, at 117.
149. Id. article III, at 119. These industries include the basic industries, such as ex-
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The test for fiscal incentives requires that the enterprise be modern and
efficient and that it should produce articles necessary for the development of
other productive activities, satisfy basic needs of the populace, replace large
volume imports, or increase exports. 150 Enterprises are then classified into
three catgories:
(I) Group A includes those enterprises that produce either capital
goods or industrial raw materials or consumer goods or semi-manufactured
products, with an additional requirement that at least fifty per cent of
the total value of the goods must be of Central American origin;
(2) Group B includes enterprises that produce consumer or semimanufactured goods with less than fifty per cent of the goods originating
in Central America, create a benefit to the balance of payments, and use
a high proportion of non-Central American materials or products;
(3) Group C includes industries that do not qualify for integrated
status.151
Groups A and B are further subdivided into new and existing industries. 15 '
New goods consist of goods not formerly produced or goods currently produced by greatly inferior methods. For the latter category the proposed plant
must fulfill a large part of an unsatisfied demand and the technological processes used must be far different from those used in the existing structure of
3
the industry.15
If a new industry does not choose integrated industry status, to compete
efficiently with an integrated industry it still must apply for the available
fiscal incentives."5 If a company qualified as a Group A or B existing industry,
it would receive enough exemptions to start operations; however, after these
exemptions ended it might have to compete with an integrated industry. This
effectively limits the number of similar industries that could or would enter
and serve this relatively small market.
It has been suggested that the transitional article to the Agreement on
the System of Central American Integrated Industries" is monopolistic
because each member state is required to have an integrated industry before
any other state receives more than one integrated industry.156 This ensures
reasonable profit to both the industry and the host nation. This division is
monopolistic because free enterprise "should determine what industries will
enter the region and where they may locate. ' "57 Any firm that has free
imports, free exports, import priorities, tax benefits, and other benefits a
host country might confer upon it is monopolistic because competition is
effectively precluded.
tracting, fishing, and fanning; service industries; and construction of low cost housing units.
150. Id. article IV, at 119.
151. Id. article V, at 121.
152. Id. article VII, at 120.
153. Id.
154. Id. article XXIX, at 126.
155. Agreement on the System of Central American Integrated Industries, June 10,
1958. As cited in EcoNoIc INTEGRATION, supra note 136, at 89.
156. Id. at 94 (Transitional Article).
157. Gordon, Joint Business Ventures in the CA CM, 21 VAND. L. REV. 315, 338 (1968).
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The policy of the United States is to help Central American industry
grow through private investment.158 Because of its ability to combine efficiently the factors of production to create profitable, vital industries, American private enterprise can play an integral part in the industrial development
of Central America.5 9 Despite the added demands of a growing populace 60
and the tremendous profit possibilities of the CACM, many corporations
hesitate to invest large amounts of capital because of the high risk involved. 16 .
Unstable economies, political instability, and the possibility of requiring a
majority of local equity participation make investors wary of the CACM.
These factors militate against the efficient employment of American know-how
and could help create inefficiency or short-term profiteering. The above, plus
the possibility that action taken in seeking integrated industry status might
violate the Sherman Act, tend to preclude investment. While the United
States ostensibly encourages private investment, it in fact contradicts this
policy when the long-arm effect of the Sherman Act is added to other factors
of uncertainty.
In a small market, such as the CACM, where factors promoting the kinds
of restrictive practices encountered in the United States simply do not exist,
the Sherman Act should not be applied merely because a company acquires
integrated industry status. 62 Two reasons seem evident for the lack of
restrictive practices in the CACM. These are the disuse of the section 1
conspiracy doctrine, caused by the use of subsidiary or branch operations
creating difficult problems of intracorporate conspiracy, and the small size
of the member nations' market, which has vitiated the necessity for a territorial allocation of markets. Because of the poorly developed infrastructure,
notably the lack of adequate transportation and communication, no competition could exist even without restraints; therefore, there is no reason for
immediate application of the Sherman Act.
It has been previously suggested that an integrated industry is in fact
a monopoly163 An American company having an integrated industry status
meets the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act. This permits a
court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the enterprise and at the same time
permits the legislative jurisdiction of the Sherman Act to attach. Under the
current per se approach to foreign commerce, if an integrated industry
restrains trade with the proscribed effect on American commerce, the only
finding necessary to establish a violation would be that an American firm
158. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
159. Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 769.
160. Joint Ventures, supra note 5, at 90.
161. Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 770.
162. Joint Ventures, supra note 5, at 88.
163. See notes 136-157 supra and accompanying text. The immense incentives granted
to an integrated industry in effect reduce the possibility of competition with an integrated
industry. If a company attempted to compete it would soon go bankrupt since it would have
none of the advantages granted an integrated industry. Competitive opportunity to enter
the market and commercial freedom to operate in the CACM would be restricted, hence
the restraint violates the doctrine of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221

U.S. i, 59 (1911).
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is part of an integrated industry. Attempting to attain the status of an
integrated industry violates either section I or section 2 of the Sherman Act
if more than one party is involved. Such an attempt would, in effect, be an
attempt to restrain trade or to monopolize. This result would likewise obtain
if a company attempted to achieve the preferential fiscal incentives without
seeking to become an integrated industry."" Either an integrated industry
or a company with preferential fiscal incentives would meet the "effects"
test of the Sherman Act inasmuch as American exports would be affected
because a discrimination could occur depending upon the country for which
the exports were intended. High profits could be applied to another American
subsidiary, providing tremendous amounts of capital with which to conduct
extensive advertising campaigns. Advertising correlates highly with marketing
success in the United States. 1 65 Seeking integrated industry status or fiscal
incentives would involve millions of dollars; the de minimus concept would
not apply to such a substantial restraint. An American company could also
produce goods in the CACM for export to the United States and could sell
them for less than the production cost of similar domestic goods.
The 1963 Protocol implies that once an industry receives integrated
industry status, a competitor may not receive it.Y ' Therefore, the company
67
will have a virtual monopoly upon the commencement of production.1 It
has been suggested that although an integrated industry in fact violates the
antitrust laws, they may not be applicable: 168
From an economic point of view, there may be strong reasons
which militate against the possible application of the Sherman Act.
The CACM is a very small market in terms of total United States
export trade. Thus, a joint venture with integrated industry status
would hardly cause a significant decrease in United States exportation
of the products made by the joint venture. Furthermore, the purpose
of the integrated industry is to supply the needs of the CACM countries, and there is little hope in the near future that these industries
will be able to export their products to the United States. Finally,
there is a great deal of doubt whether a joint venture with minority
participation by an American company will come under the proscription of section 2 of the Sherman Act merely because such joint
venture has a protected monopoly position within a foreign market.
164. Central American Agreement on Fiscal Incentives to Industrial Development, July
31, 1962, as cited in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 136, at 117.
165. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (the Court
indicated that advertising revenues from one company could be plowed back into another
company, thus effectively foreclosing a market). See American Tobacco Co. v. United States,

328 U.S. 781 (1946).
166. MORGAN GUARANTEE TRUsT Co., THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MIARKEr 2 (1964);
see Protocol to the Agreement on the System of Central American Integrated Industries,
Jan. 29, 1963 (article III), as cited in ECONOMIC INTE.GRATION, supra note 136, at 95.
167. joint Ventures, supra note 5, at 110. It is noteworthy that the Agency for InterAmerican Development will grant no loans to any company seeking to become an integrated
industry. Apparently, the reason for the policy is the monopolistic character of such status.
MORGAN GUARANTEE TRUST Co., THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 10 (1964).
168. Joint Ventures, supra note 5, at 112.
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This statement is in all probability true. However, the real problem concerns
the joint venture involving majority participation by an American firm.
Few companies, especially those of large size, will engage in a joint venture
with much risk if they have no control over the enterprise. Enforcement
policies of the Department of Justice might even require application of the
Sherman Act to a joint venture with minority participation by an American
company. 00 Although apparently inequitable, this could be justified on the
ground that the American company probably violated the Sherman Act by
initially seeking integrated industry status.
Another problem is the lack of defenses available to an American company
having or seeking the status of an integrated industry. Apparently the
after-the-fact defense of economic or political barriers would not be applicable
because it may be raised only after an American industry has been precluded
from the market because it could not effectively compete with an existing
integrated industry. This defense would not apply to an alleged attempt to
acquire the status of an integrated industry. Claiming that such restraints are
only ancillary to a legitimate object seems of little value because in seeking
the status of an integrated industry the primary objective seems to be acquisition of a monopoly. The only arguable defense would be business conditions,
but even this has been rejected by the Supreme Court.17° The defense of
mandatory requirements is not applicable because a company is not required
to accept integrated industry status. Rather, it would be incidental to the
policy of strengthening the economies of CACM member nations. It has been
suggested that accepting such a required status would not be a valid antitrust
defense. 17' Although a monopoly status is acceptable if it is naturally
achieved 7 2- seeking integrated industry status implies the element of intent
necessary to violate the Sherman Act.
SHERMAN

In recent
joint venture
is available' 1 4
preference of

AcT

VIOLATIONS BY JOINT VENTURES IN THE

CACM173

years there has been a definite trend toward the use of the
in foreign commerce, especially if local equity participation
on a voluntary rather than mandatory basis. The reasons for
the equity joint venture are varied: 175

In many instances where the local entrepreneur obtains only non-equity
technical assistance, the assistance may not be as effective as if he
were additionally to receive financial support in the form of operating
169. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
170. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
171. L. FUGATE, FOREIuN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 149 (1958). Contra, Joint
Ventures, supra note 5, at 115.
172. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
173. As used herein, the term "joint venture" means two or more persons organizing to
carry out manufacturing activities for an unlimited time.
174. Friedmann, Antitrust Law and Joint InternationalBusiness Ventures in Economically
Underdeveloped Countries,60 CoLUM. L. REv. 780 (1960).
175. Gordon, supra note 157, at 321.
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capital, equipment and supplies. Financial support could consist of a
limited equity participation on the part of the United States investor,
management control being retained by the host country. Furthermore,
some equity involvement by a United States partner may be helpful in
that it is more likely to discourage other United States investors from
entering the market.
There are several cogent reasons for choosing the joint venture form of
business organization. First, in a joint venture each person is required to
make a smaller capital outlay, therefore proportionally reducing the risks;
second, local equity participation fosters better public relations, which may
further induce the foreign government to assist the venture through legislation; third, since both a joint venture and a wholly owned subsidiary would
compete with local business, the joint venture with local equity participation
would be preferable and less subject to criticism because there is a "partnership" of foreign and domestic interests; fourth, local law may require some
local ownership; and fifth, involving local capital stimulates employee interest
and yields a more efficient organization.- G Only one major consideration
militates against this form of business organization for all companies. It
would not be in the best interest of a large company to use the joint venture
because over-all coordination of the company might be impaired.-,; Once
an investment is made, it is not unreasonable for the majority American
investor to expect to control the foreign joint venture. However, since the
Sherman Act may apply, it is likely that the investor may abandon CACM
activities altogether rather than seek another form of investment.
Several forms of joint venture are available for an American company
wishing to enter the CACM. These include joining with another American
company, joining with a foreign company not located in the CACM, joining
with the host country, or joining with a local company in the CACM. In
determining the possible application of the Sherman Act, those principles
applicable to domestic joint ventures are used.17s The legality of a joint venture is determined in the same manner as a merger because the basic purpose
of each is to promote competition.- 9 It has been suggested that a joint venture
will be attacked if a reasonable likelihood exists that it will tend to create a
monopoly.180 Under such circumstances liability for a Sherman Act violation
may arise at an earlier point in time than for other alleged violations. The
Department of Justice has established certain guidelines to determine whether
competition will be lessened and liability will result:""
To determine whether there is any reasonable probability of lessening of competition (a) between the two parents in any market or (b)
176. Forms of Investment, supra note 8, at 434.
177. See Joint Ventures, supra note 5, at 92.
178. See Latin American Development, supra note 4, at 786.
179. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964). The Department
of Justice has adopted this policy. Bernstein, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Developments: Anti-Competitive Joint Ventures, 10

180.
181.

ANTITRUST

BULL. 25 (1965).

Bernstein, supra note 179, at 27.
Id.
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between actual or potential competitors of the newly foried company
. . we. must examine the activities of the, joint venturers and themarkets in which they are all engaged. In addition, where neither of
the parents are in competition, we inquire into the likelihood of
whether they would have competed in the new venture had they not
combined their efforts. We investigate to determine whether they have
the resources, capabilities, and interest, and what, if anything, they did
in an attempt to enter alone or with some other partner which could
not have entered alone.
This test seems to prevent the existence of a legal joint venture if the
product produced by it is the same as that of the parent, because neither the
82
parents nor the joint venture would want to compete with the other.1
Two American companies creating a joint venture designed to enter the
CACM would be subject to the Sherman Act. A Sherman Act violation could
probably be found if either or both of the companies explored the possibility
of entering the CACM, providing either had sufficient resources and know-how
to enter the CACM independently. If the joint venturers were competitors,
a violation of the Sherman Act could occur per se because the parents and
the joint venture probably would not compete. 18 3 Less risk would be entailed
if the two companies were not competitors because their entry into a market
as a joint venture seems more suitable to a rule of reason approach. However,
neither company could exert undue influence upon the other to prevent
competition from the joint venture. In United States v. Pan American World
Airways,5 5 a joint venture between Pan American and Grace Company was
organized with each company owning fifty per cent. On a complaint charging
a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the court held that Pan
American, exercising its fifty per cent block to prevent the joint venture from
obtaining a Panama-Miami airline route, had monopolized and attempted to
monopolize foreign trade or commerce. The court concluded that Pan
American's action evidenced an attempt to obtain a purely economic selfbenefit and, therefore, no defense was presented. In addressing itself to the
power of exclusion by an American company the court indicated hope for the
joint venture in the CACM by stating that a restraint must be examined in
context before the exercise of power to exclude a competitor from a relevant
8 5
market will create a monopoly.
The risk of the long-arm application of the Sherman Act to an American
corporation and a foreign corporation entering into a joint venture appears
to be about the same as to a joint venture entered by two domestic companies.
In the case of domestic and foreign competitors a great deal of business risk
exists. It has been suggested that a showing of economic necessity might
counterbalance the inherent restraint,186 but such a defense has been rejected
182. Id. at 26-27.
183. Cf. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
184. 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The court stated that the airlines industry and

the shipping industry were not members of the same relevant market.
185.
186.

Id. at 41.
R.:P. ATr'y GEN. Comm. 90 (1955); Forms of Investment, supra note 8, at 445.
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by the Supreme Court.1 7 In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd., 88 it was held that a joint venture formed to develop a foreign market
for the mutual benefit of two companies, both of which were already competing in the same market, was a per se violation of the antitrust laws. If an
American company and a foreign company not in competition create a joint
venture, a violation of the Sherman Act might occur if a wrongful intent
could be ascribed to the joint venturers. In United States v. Bayer Co., 189
a case involving a domestic and a foreign company that did not compete, the
court held that such a combination violated section I of the Sherman Act
when the two companies created a joint venture with the intent to divide
world markets.
If an American company and the government of a CACM member nation
create a joint venture, the chances of an antitrust violation may seem small,
yet, if a restraint of trade affecting American business occurs, the Sherman
Act could be applied. In such an instance, if the acts were required by the
foreign government in order to conduct business, a defense would arise as
if the foreign government itself did the acts. A consideration of whether the
American company had control of the joint venture would be pertinent
because violations of the Sherman Act could nonetheless occur if the American partner were able to exert control over the enterprise. This violation
would be a conspiracy between the joint venture and the American parent.
In such a situation application for, and acceptance of, the status of an integrated industry may make the parent presumptively liable, since the action
may be imputed to the controlling parent.'9 0 The reason for this notion is
that an integrated industry prevents United States' exportation to the CACM;
this "is the evil proscribed by the Sherman Act."' 91 Although no case involving a joint venture seeking integrated industry status in the CACM has been
decided, in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,' 9- the defense of

sovereign immunity was permitted when the Government of Costa Rica
effectively expropriated the holdings of the American Banana Company.
However, similar facts arising in the context of a joint venture involving a
controlling American company would probably subject the participants to
the penalties of the Sherman Act. In the area of a joint venture, United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp.193 appears to control. An American company and

a Mexican company, which was organized by the Mexican Government, conspired to have favorable legislation passed. Although the Sisal Sales Company
had been the only company that had shown a profit in importing sisal, the
economic necessity argument was ignored by the Court. It held that the fact
that the agreements had been made in the United States, even though the
Mexican Government was a co-conspirator, was enough to create antitrust
187. Timken Roller Bearing Co.v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
188. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
189. 135 F. Supp. 65, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
190. joint Ventures, supra note 5,at 111.
191. Id. at 112.
192. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
193. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
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liability. By seeking special legislation the companies were in effect monopolizing by acts not required by a foreign government at the time of organization
of the joint venture. Thus, if a foreign government creates a corporation
especially for the joint venture, even though that corporation is an instrumentality of the foreign government, violation of the Sherman Act may still
occur. In United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft,94 the court
held that a foreign corporation organized by a sovereign government did not
give rise to the defense of sovereign immunity. This holding was apparently
based upon a State Department letter stating that a foreign government
engaged in commerce through the vehicle of a foreign corporation was not
immune to the antitrust laws.
There is no case law specifically applicable to a joint venture between an
American company and a local business in an underdeveloped country. Since
this manner of investment seems to be most favorable for the CACM, g the
possibility of long-arm application of the Sherman Act to the joint venture
must be considered. If the two joint venturers seek the status of an integrated
industry, antitrust consequences could arise if the effects test of the Sherman
Act is met. If the two participants do not seek integrated industry status,
the joint venture has no immediate antitrust impact. Yet, if they do not seek
integrated industry status, another company probably will seek it. Until the
Sherman Act's applicability to an integrated industry is clarified or the policy
conflict is resolved in favor of private investment, it would appear unwise
to seek integrated industry status because of the many uncertainties that exist
in the current interpretation of the Sherman Act.
CONCLUSION

If the CACM is to utilize the private investment of American enterprise,
certain changes must occur to clarify the uncertainty that exists in the longarm application of the Sherman Act. One solution to the current policy
conflict is to give more weight to encouraging private investment in the CACM
than to strict application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce. This
could be accomplished by broadening the scope of the conference between the
Department of Justice and the Department of State to include foreign
business considerations in the over-all policy of the United States toward the
CACM. The Sherman Act should be amended to limit its application to
foreign commerce and to permit certain defenses, such as business conditions,
to be used. Another possible solution is to require the Department of Justice
to adopt specific guidelines for applying the Sherman Act in the area of
foreign commerce. In this manner business concerns would know what actions
are legal. Under this regulatory approach advance clearance procedures should
be available for businesses wishing to invest in the CACM. Although clearance
procedures would not necessarily block a future antitrust suit, they would
lend more stability to the application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce.
194.
195.

31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
Friedmann, supra note 174, at 781.
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